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JUSTICE STEVENS'S THEORY OF INTERACTIVE
FEDERALISM
Robert A. Schapiro*
INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens advances a strong vision
of national unity. Like Justice Wiley Rutledge, for whom he clerked,
Justice Stevens understands the United States Constitution as a document
fundamentally designed to promote and preserve the union. The primary
role of federal courts is to vindicate constitutional values, including the
value of national unity. These background principles of unity provide the
context for Justice Stevens's conception of federalism. In his thirty-five
years on the bench, Justice Stevens has elaborated a robust theory of
federalism. His theory, however, contrasts sharply with the dualist
federalism that became the regnant model of the Rehnquist Court.
Dual federalism, the idea that the national government and the states
enjoy exclusive and nonoverlapping spheres of authority, does not describe
the actual operation of government in the United States today. On the
contrary, the overlap of national and state activities is ubiquitous. In areas
ranging from narcotics trafficking1 to securities trading 2 to education, 3
concurrent federal and state regulation is the norm. With the recent wave of
national crises, including the War on Terrorism and Hurricane Katrina, the
growth of state and national power and the resulting overlap in authority,
seems likely to increase.
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Law Clerk for Justice John Paul
Stevens, October Term 1991. Email: rschapir@law.emory.edu. My thanks to Abner S.
Greene, Helen Herman, Eduardo M. Pefialver, Dean William Treanor, and all others who
helped to organize the conference on the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. Thanks also to
the other participants in the panel on federalism, David J. Barron, Allison Marston Danner,
Thomas H. Lee, and Adam Marcus Samaha. Noah Robbins and Gregory Sicilian provided
skilled research assistance for this Article. Terry Gordon and Will Haines of the Emory
University School of Law Library offered valuable aid as well. I, like so many others, owe a
special debt of gratitude to Justice John Paul Stevens, a great judge, scholar, teacher, mentor,
and friend.
1. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 643, 675-76 (1997) (noting overlap of state and federal criminal statutes).
2. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 592 (2003)
(noting extensive overlap of state and federal regulation of corporate law).
3. See, e.g., The No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578) (imposing extensive federal guidelines on state
educational policy).
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Even in the more rarified atmosphere of the United States Supreme
Court, the normative project of fully dividing state from federal power has
little support. Since the advent of the New Deal Court in 1937, the Court
no longer seeks to maintain strict boundaries between state and federal
realms.4 On the present Court, only Justice Clarence Thomas has shown
any inclination to return to the pre-New Deal conceptions of dual
sovereignty. 5
While dual federalism no longer remains a credible project,6 dualist
federalism persists, at least on the Court and in the academy, if not in the
operation of government in the United States. Dualist federalism does not
seek to enforce strict borders between state and federal power. Dualist
federalism acknowledges substantial areas of concurrent jurisdiction.
However, dualist federalism defines some activities as inherently local and
beyond the reach of federal power and other areas as inherently national and
beyond the authority of state regulation. Dualist federalism accepts some
overlap of state and federal authority, but seeks to safeguard some sacred
precincts of complete state or federal hegemony. Dualist federalism defines
these protected enclaves in terms of subject matter. Some activities are
local; others are national. Constitutional principles of federalism protect the
local sphere from federal intrusion. 7
A recurrent problem for dualist federalism is how to define the boundary
between federal and state domains, between the "truly national" and the
"truly local." Policing this doctrinal border becomes especially difficult
because of its seeming irrelevance in contemporary experience. Faced with
this vexing problem, the Court has attempted to maintain the national/local
boundary through various categorical distinctions, such as distinguishing
between economic and noneconomic activity8 or between generally
applicable laws and laws that regulate the states as states. 9
In applying these categories, the Court has ended up limiting both state
and federal activities in ways that make little sense from the perspective of
a normative theory of federalism. The much-noted tension between the
4. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 17
(1950).
5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(criticizing the Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause since 1937); see
also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2235-37 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the "substantial effects" prong of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
6. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 Duke
L.J. 1513, 1638-39 (2002) ("Even within the narrow context of congressional power, where
the Rehnquist Court has displayed a vestigial attraction to principles of dual sovereignty, the
revival of pre-New Deal federalism is hardly a credible project.").
7. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) ("The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 567-68.
8. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("[T]hus far in our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
9. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-80 (1992).
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Rehnquist Court's professed solicitude for states in its Commerce Clause
and Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases and its constriction of state
authority in its preemption cases provides one illustration of the normative
difficulties. 10
Elsewhere, I have proposed a different model of federalism, which,
following Professor Martin Redish,11 I have termed "interactive"
federalism. 12 I believe that interactive federalism provides a more accurate
descriptive account of the operation of government in the United States and
also offers a more attractive normative approach to realizing the benefits of
federalism. Interactive federalism understands the interaction, rather than
the separation, of state and federal power as the principal dynamic of
federalism. Interactive federalism rejects the idea of creating enclaves of
exclusive state and federal power. Interactive federalism, I have argued,
can advance the same values claimed for dualist federalism, while creating
fewer doctrinal problems.
While the key problem for dualist federalism is how to divide local and
national realms, the chief difficulty for interactive federalism is how to
manage the overlap between state and federal authority. Without clearly
defined regions of sovereignty, how can the potentially conflicting state and
federal regimes be mediated? While I have attempted to sketch a theory of
reconciliation, the more difficult task is to fill in the resulting doctrinal
framework, to figure out how to resolve particular cases. Happily, a much
greater mind has been laboring at this task for the last thirty-five years.
My goal in this Article is to explain how the federalism jurisprudence of
Justice Stevens can be understood to reflect this interactive framework.
Justice Stevens accepts the overlap of state and federal authority and rejects
the notion of enclaves of exclusive state and federal power. States play an
important part in Justice Stevens's jurisprudence, but they serve as partners,
not antagonists, with the national government in a federalist system.
Through an examination of several doctrinal areas, I illustrate the
implications of an interactive approach. I argue that Justice Stevens's
jurisprudence illustrates the capacity of federalism to empower both states
and the national government. An exploration of his opinions also highlights
the assumptions about states and about the nature of the political process
that underlie an interactive approach to federalism. Further, this perspective
on Justice Stevens's theory of federalism serves to resolve some of the
10. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 5.2, at
379 (2d ed. 2002) ("[I]t is somewhat surprising that the current Supreme Court, with its
commitment to federalism and protecting states' rights, has been quite willing to find federal
preemption." (footnote omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 462-63 (2002); Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 368-69 (noting the
contrast between preemption cases and cases dealing with the scope of Congress's
affirmative legislative powers).
11. See Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 29 (1995).
12. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev.
243 (2005).
2006] 2135
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
seeming tensions within his jurisprudence, such as his relatively permissive
approach to state regulation in the area of federal preemption as compared
to his relatively broad conception of the preemptive sweep of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 13 I hope as well to shed light on how states of the
United States are like or unlike Finland. 14
Part I clarifies the competing models of dualist federalism and interactive
federalism. Drawing on the opinions and other writings of Justice
Rutledge, Part II develops the key organizing features of Justice Stevens's
overall approach to federalism. Part III explores how Justice Stevens's
opinions reflect the interactive model of federalism. This part surveys
Justice Stevens's approach to federal regulatory authority, to state and
federal judicial authority, and to state regulatory authority. In this latter
area, which includes federal preemption and dormant Commerce Clause
cases, Justice Stevens confronts the greatest challenge to a theory of
interactive federalism. Part IV examines the assumptions and implications
of the interactive model, as illustrated in Justice Stevens's jurisprudence.
I. MODELS OF FEDERALISM
Good fences make good neighbors.' 5
Something there is that doesn't love a wall.... Before I built a wall I'd
ask to know/What I was walling in or walling out. 16
A. Dualist Federalism
1. The Doctrinal Conundrums of Dualist Federalism
In its recent federalism cases, the United States Supreme Court has
affirmed a dualist understanding of federalism. Indeed, to emphasize the
independent stature of states, the Court has used the term "dual
sovereignty" to describe its conception of the federal system. 17 A majority
of the Court asserts that the constitutional principle of federalism requires
drawing a line between the local and the national. This five-Justice
majority further insists that it is up to the Court to police this boundary,
13. See Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 93, 116 n.143
(2002) ("Justice Stevens turns aggressively preemptive when he himself, rather than some
mere legislator or bureaucrat, does the preempting. He is the Court's most forceful advocate
of constitutional preemption under the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause.").
14. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(comparing a state court to courts in Finland).
15. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,240 (1995) (Scalia, J.).
16. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Robert Frost's poem,
Mending Wall).
17. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) ("It is incontestible that
the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty."' (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))).
2136 [Vol. 74
INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM
preventing the federal government from encroaching on state turf.18 In the
Court's conception of dual federalism, when a border dispute breaks out
between two sovereigns, one sovereign should not be the judge. 19
As the Court has recognized, distinguishing between local and national
activities is not easy. To enforce the boundary between state and national
power the Court has relied on a set of categorical distinctions. This reliance
on a categorical approach follows from the Court's insistence on judicially
enforceable boundaries. The Court has admitted that the lines it draws may
be arbitrary. However, it insists that for federalism to be judicially
enforceable, there must be lines. Policing lines is something that courts can
do.
In the Commerce Clause area, for example, former Chief Justice William
Rehnquist defended the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial activity as necessary, while acknowledging the difficulty of
its application:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is
commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal
uncertainty. But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits,
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will
engender "legal uncertainty." 20
Similarly, the Court has acknowledged the formalism entailed in its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. 21
In addition to relying on formalistic and often arbitrary limitations on
federal power, the dualist conception of federalism also has little to
contribute to sorting out the inevitable overlap of state and federal
authority. Dualism accepts overlap, but has difficulty addressing it. The
Court has developed no coherent approach to potential conflicts of state and
federal regulation in areas that do not constitute enclaves of state
sovereignty. What happens when federal and state rules operate
concurrently in areas of economic activity, which are not inherently "local"
and do not count as "commandeering" states? The federalism of the
Rehnquist Court has no capacity to resolve these situations.
18. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 n.3 (2000) (criticizing "the
dissent's remarkable theory that the commerce power is without judicially enforceable
boundaries").
19. Before this view gained majority support, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed
the idea pointedly in her dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("With the abandonment of National
League of Cities, all that stands between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and
Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."); cf Post, supra note 6, at
1578-79 (discussing the Taft Court's understanding of the role of the judiciary in
safeguarding federalism).
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (quoting id. at 630 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
21. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
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With its formalistic framework of dual sovereignty, the Court has applied
broad principles of preemption forestalling state regulatory efforts. The
Court also has used the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a wide
range of state laws. As commentators have noted, it is difficult to make
these areas fit within the Court's larger theory of federalism. 22 One can
construct a doctrinal consistency: The national government has the power
to regulate interstate commerce. So, the Court gives a broad preemptive
scope to federal laws, regulations, and policies that relate to commerce.
Indeed, the scope is so broad that not only are state laws and judicial
proceedings preempted by actual federal regulations, but the dormant
Commerce Clause also negates a broad sweep of state regulation as
conflicting with the unexercised federal power to regulate interstate
commerce. The Court's categorical framework creates a winner-take-all
approach to federalism. If the Court deems the regulated activity not
sufficiently commercial, then congressional action is constitutionally
prohibited. If the activity does count as commercial, then state regulation is
limited. This categorical federalism does not welcome concurrent state and
federal action.
From the perspective of the formal categories of dualist federalism, one
can understand why the federal government has no power to regulate
violence against women 23 at the same time that state common-law suits
relating to airbags in cars are preempted. 24 Similarly, one can understand
why the federal government cannot ban the possession of a gun near a
school, 25 while state regulations of tobacco advertising near schools are
deemed preempted by federal law.26 Outside the judicially defined sphere
of commercial activity, the federal government is powerless; inside that
sphere state regulation is suspect. While doctrinally consistent, the
resulting doctrine is normatively puzzling. Why would one want a theory
of federalism thitt produces such results?
2. Dualist Theories of Federalism
Academic commentators generally decry the Court's formalistic attempt
to police the boundary between state and federal power. Nevertheless, the
most prominent theoretical defenses of federalism also operate within a
fundamentally dualist framework. For most scholars, the dominant problem
of federalism remains how to divide state and federal spheres of authority.
22. See supra note 10 (citing sources).
23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (holding unconstitutional the private cause of action
created by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
24. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
25. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
26. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); see also id at 598 n.8
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(pointing out tension between Lorillard and Lopez); David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism
with Federalism: If It's Not Just a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?,
74 Fordham L. Rev. 2081, 2112-13 (2006) (discussing the tension between Lorillard and
Lopez).
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A brief outline of the most common justifications for federalism reveals
these dualist underpinnings.
a. The Values of Dualism
Arguments for federalism generally can be grouped within three
conceptual categories, based on economic, republican, and liberal
approaches. From the economic perspective, states function as firms,
competing in the policy marketplace. By offering differing baskets of taxes
and regulations, states provide people choice and the opportunity to realize
their subjective preferences. 27  The republican approach to federalism
emphasizes democratic self-governance. Federalism allows individuals to
deliberate in smaller scale settings and reach reasoned judgments about
political decisions. States act as republics, offering a greater opportunity
for democratic participation than possible at the national level.28 From a
liberal perspective, states act as bulwarks against tyranny. By dividing
power between the states and the national government, the Constitution
makes it more difficult for any one center of power to gain complete
domination and oppress the people. In a federalist system, the tyrant must
win control over both state and national governments. 29
A few fundamental principles follow from these accounts of federalism.
First, the boundaries between state and federal power must be maintained.
Further, the borders must be clearly demarcated; the chalk lines must be
kept clean. People cannot enjoy the benefits of choice and variety offered
by interstate competition if the federal government imposes a single,
uniform regulatory product. The policy products also must be clearly
branded so that citizen/consumers know who is responsible for what
regulations. Clear lines allow citizen/consumers to be good policy
shoppers. Republican self-governance can flourish only if states have real
27. Classic treatments of the economic arguments for federalism include Friedrich A.
Hayek, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, New Commonwealth Q., Sept.
1939, at 131, reprinted in Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 255
(1948), and Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956). For more recent discussions of market-based arguments for federalism, see, e.g.,
David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 77-85 (1995); William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism
in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. L.J. 201 (1997) (critically reviewing the economic
arguments for federalism); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper
Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 555 (1994); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493-
98 (1987); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (1995).
28. For discussions of federalism as promoting political participation, see, e.g., Barry
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 389-94 (1997); S. Candice Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 710-14 (1991);
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1988); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341,401-08.
29. See Shapiro, supra note 27, at 36; Friedman, supra note 28, at 402-05; Rapaczynski,
supra note 28, at 380-89.
2006] 2139
FORDHAM LA W RE VIEW
control over certain areas. Again, citizens must know which level of
government has responsibility for which areas so that they can exercise
their self-governance responsibly. From a liberal perspective, without a
distinctive state sphere, the dual protection against tyranny ceases. Clear
lines ensure against creeping encroachment.
Second, the national government cannot, itself, draw the boundary lines.
The national government may not wish to promote regulatory choice.
Further, states and the federal government may collude to impose a uniform
national policy and avoid the discipline of regulatory competition.
Republican self-governance should not be a matter of the grace of the
national government. From the perspective of preventing tyranny, the
national government cannot be trusted to limit itself. Allowing the national
government to draw the lines between state and federal power would be
putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.
Third, the dualist models of federalism generally correspond to an
understanding of states as distinctive communities of value. Citizens in
different states differ in important ways. They have different goals,
different ideals. These fundamental differences both serve to justify the
boundaries between states and also help to demarcate the appropriate
borderlines. Because the states function as loci of values, the need for local
choice becomes particularly important. The diversity of views among states
requires a broad policy market. Moreover, recognizing the boundaries
between states allows the distinctive republican communities to realize the
outcomes of their deliberations, free from outside interference. The
divergence among the values in the different states also helps to suggest
proper lines between national and state authority. With regard to the issues
on which the states differ, states should enjoy autonomy. On matters of
overlapping beliefs, federal control may be appropriate.
b. The Pathologies of Dualism
The division of state and federal power may cause harm, instead of good.
From the market perspective, federalism promotes competition, choice, and
innovation. Market failures, such as externalities, on the other hand,
suggest the potential pitfalls of federalism.
Consideration of individual rights presents further grounds for caution.
The economic perspective, like other manifestations of utilitarianism, tends
not to give much regard to individuals and their rights. 30 Federalism also
can help to foster deliberative democracy in the civic republican tradition.
Real opportunities for participation, however, cannot occur at the state
level, given the relatively vast scale of most states. Federal intervention
may be necessary to ensure republican governance at the local level.
Federalism can act as a bulwark against tyranny by dividing governmental
30. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 27 (1971) ("Utilitarianism does not take
seriously the distinction between persons.").
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power. States can function as guardians of individuals against an
overweening central authority. History has amply demonstrated, though,
that it can be the states that produce the worst forms of tyranny. 31 A strong
central government may be necessary to protect citizens from state
governmental abuse.
Attempting to reconcile the promise and pitfalls of dualist federalism
presents difficult problems. The dualist perspective offers few resources for
addressing these challenges. Dualism can urge that the line between state
and federal authority be drawn in one place, rather than another, but it
offers little assistance in sorting out the inevitable overlap of state and
federal authority.
B. Interactive Federalism
Interactive federalism rejects the three key elements of dualism. First, it
does not seek to draw boundaries between state and federal power. Second,
with regard to conflicts that may arise, its understanding of the political
process does not prohibit the national government from coordinating state
and federal claims. Third, interactive federalism does not conceive of states
as distinctive communities of value.
Disavowing the project of drawing lines between state and federal
realms, interactive federalism embraces the overlap of state and federal
power. Interactive federalism still seeks to advance the values of choice,
self-rule, and prevention of tyranny, but it aims to promote those goals by
harnessing the interaction of governments, rather than by limiting them.
Interactive federalism supports concurrent power both in the area of
regulatory jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. In this conception, the
domains of state and federal laws overlap and so do the domains of state
and federal courts.
Rather than a sovereignty-based conception of state and federal power,
interactive federalism relies on an organizational conception. The state and
federal governments are understood as different nodes of power. The
geographical expanse of state power may be more limited, but the subject
matter of state and federal power need not differ. These nodes of power
produce plurality and redundancy, which constitute important mechanisms
for realizing the promise of federalism.
Because of its embrace of overlapping jurisdiction, interactive federalism
need not draw lines between state and federal power. Interactive federalism
rejects the "good fences make good neighbors" framework. Interactive
federalism thus avoids the doctrinal difficulties involved in trying to
distinguish between the truly local and the truly national. In this way,
interactive federalism acquiesces in the vast overlap of state and federal
power that characterizes the operation of government in the United States.
31. See, e.g., William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 155 (1964)
("[I]f in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.").
2006] 2141
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
While interactive federalism need not draw lines, it still must deal with
conflict. If state and federal governments regulate the same turf, what
happens when their rules conflict? These potential and actual conflicts
present the biggest challenge for interactive federalism. Two key
components of conflict resolution are the what and the who: What are the
standards for determining when conflict is impermissible, and who applies
these standards?
Generally, for interactive federalism, the question whether a given
situation entails valuable overlap or impermissible conflict turns on the
relative values of plurality and redundancy on the one hand and the counter-
values of uniformity and hierarchical accountability on the other.32
Concurrent exercise of authority tends to promote a plurality of
regulatory regimes. State and federal law and state and federal courts all
may be addressing a particular area. Different governments may offer
different kinds of solutions. For example, the national government may
impose one kind of environmental regulation, and a state government may
impose a different, overlapping set of rules. The state and federal
approaches each may offer a partial solution. The coexistence of state and
federal regimes may yield a better overall regulatory scheme. From the
interactive perspective, this pluralism constitutes one of the chief benefits of
federalism.
Along with plurality, concurrent jurisdiction produces redundancy. 33
The availability of state and federal governments means that if one fails to
solve a problem, the other remains available. Federal habeas corpus review
of state criminal convictions constitutes one example of such redundancy. 34
The existence and similar enforcement activities of New York Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer and the Securities and Exchange Commission
provides another example.
Jurisdictional overlap may impede the values of uniformity and
accountability. Sometimes, what is required is one set of rules, not many.
The burden of complying with concurrent regulatory regimes may be
excessive. Further, the absence of jurisdictional boundaries may blur lines
of accountability. If no one entity has exclusive jurisdiction, it may be
difficult to fix blame. The dualist impulse to demarcate realms of
32. In other accounts of interactive federalism, I have employed the additional principles
of dialogue and finality. See Schapiro, supra note 12, at 188-94 (discussing the values of
dialogue and finality). Dialogue is closely linked to plurality and redundancy, while finality
is tied to uniformity and hierarchical accountability. For purposes of analyzing Justice
Stevens's jurisprudence, I have streamlined that analytic framework, focusing just on
plurality and redundancy on the one hand, and uniformity and hierarchical accountability on
the other.
33. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 656-57 (1981) (discussing the values of
redundancy); Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 Publius: J.
Federalism, Fall 1973, at 173, 188-89 (emphasizing the role of federalism in providing
redundancy).
34. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977).
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jurisdiction may promote these values. In each area, such as "local" or
"national," a single uniform regulatory regime can exist. If something does
not function well within one of these realms, the party deserving blame will
be clear.
While interactive federalism rejects the idea of enforcing jurisdictional
boundaries for their own sake, it seeks to accommodate the organizational
values of uniformity and accountability, when they are necessary.
Resolving potential conflicts generally involves deciding if one government
must yield because of the need for uniformity or accountability in a
particular area. State and federal policies can co-exist as long as uniformity
and hierarchical accountability are not required.
The question then becomes: Who decides which values predominate?
From the organizational perspective of interactive federalism, Congress
generally provides the best answer. Congress stands in a good position to
assess the relative importance of plurality versus uniformity, of redundancy
versus hierarchical accountability. Moreover, because the interactive
perspective does not understand states to constitute distinctive communities
of value, Congress does not stand as a hostile, self-interested force. To the
extent that states and the national government are engaged in a joint effort
to realize a shared core of common values, the national government
becomes a sensible focus of coordination.
In sum, in place of the fundamental principles of dualist federalism,
interactive federalism reflects the following basic, linked conceptions.
First, no subject matter limits restrain the scope of state and federal
authority. No enclaves of state or federal regulation receive constitutional
protection from the encroachments of federal or state power. Second, it is
the dynamic overlap of state and federal authority that provides a primary
mechanism for federalism to advance its goals. Accordingly, the concurrent
exercise of state and federal power should be promoted. Not only are
jurisdictional lines unnecessary to advancing the aims of federalism, but
they are also counterproductive. Third, conflicts between state and federal
authority should generally be resolved by well-functioning political bodies,
rather than by the courts. However, the courts do retain an important role in
enforcing and protecting the policies decided by political bodies and in
guarding against malfunctions of the political system. Fourth, when
conflicts do arise, the body resolving the conflicts (generally Congress)
should seek to advance the overall goals of federalism, usually by reliance
on principles of plurality and redundancy, though recognizing the need for
uniformity and hierarchical accountability in some areas. No resort should
be had to abstract categories of "truly local" or "truly national" activity.
In this Article, I argue that Justice Stevens's jurisprudence of federalism
can be understood as an exemplification of the interactive model. Still,
Justice Stevens sometimes employs the language of dualism. Given that he
sits on a Court that invokes the rhetoric of dualist federalism, it is not
surprising that he uses those terms to argue his points. In narrowly
interpreting the preemptive force of federal law, in particular, Justice
2006] 2143
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Stevens invokes dualist concepts, such as the "historic police powers of the
States"35 and the notion that "the States are independent sovereigns in our
federal system."'36  Nevertheless, Justice Stevens's overall vision of
federalism specifically, and of government power generally, comports with
the interactive model.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS'S VISION OF FEDERALISM
This part outlines the broad principles that Justice Stevens has identified
as central to his conception of federalism in the United States.
A. The Rutledge Vision: The Commerce Clause As a Unifying Force
In elaborating the crucial elements of his understanding of federalism,
Justice Stevens often has cited Justice Rutledge, for whom he served as a
clerk. In a series of lectures, later published as a book, Justice Rutledge set
forth his understanding of the Commerce Clause as a central feature of the
United States Constitution. 37 Indeed, Justice Rutledge asserted that the
impetus behind the Commerce Clause provided the main influence in the
drafting and adoption of the Constitution. 38 Justice Rutledge emphasized
the role of the Commerce Clause in creating a national economic unit and
giving Congress the power to sustain it. In this book and in his judicial
opinions, Justice Rutledge stressed the role of the Constitution in general,
and the Commerce Clause in particular, in creating a strong national
union. 39 He acknowledged potential limits on the power of the national
government40; his focus, however, clearly lay on the Commerce Clause as
an instrument of empowerment, not of limitation.
Justice Rutledge also stressed the need to understand the Commerce
Clause as not unduly limiting the power of states.4 1 Justice Rutledge was
writing against the not-so-distant background of a dualist Court that had
demonstrated reluctance to allow concurrent state and federal regulation. 42
In view of the broad powers that the federal government could exercise
after 1937, it was important to ensure that state regulation was not
concomitantly restricted.
35. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
36. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
37. Wiley Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith (1947)
38. See id at 25-26.
39. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
231-35 (1948).
40. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 37, at 76.
41. See id at 71.
42. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1121-25 (2000).
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B. Justice Rutledge and Interactive Federalism
Responding to the strong dualist strains of the pre-1937 Court, Justice
Rutledge emphasized the important role of concurrent state and national
authority. The locus classicus for accepting overlapping state and federal
power in certain areas was Cooley v. Board of Wardens,43 and Justice
Rutledge lavished praise on this decision. He termed that case a
"landmark,"'44 and it guided his understanding of federalism as facilitating
joint state and federal action.45
Justice Rutledge rejected the notion that federalism prohibited concurrent
state and federal regulation. In language that constituted a rebuttal of the
New York v. United States opinion written nearly fifty years later, he wrote,
"It would be a shocking thing, if state and federal governments acting
together were prevented from achieving the end desired by both, simply
because of the division of power between them."'46 One commentator has
summarized Justice Rutledge's interactive vision as follows: "Instead of
employing a 'two-value' (either/or) logic of exclusion, Justice Rutledge
introduced another category of commerce clause thinking, based on the
principle of synthesis.... [H]is primary emphasis was upon coordination as
against separation of authority in the federal scheme. '47
Justice Rutledge's conception of federalism involved empowering both
states and the federal government. He understood that the potential for
conflict existed, and he stood ready to address it. However, he generally
saw the broad exercise of both state and federal power as important features
of the constitutional system.48
When the need did arise to adjudicate potential conflicts between state
and federal power, Justice Rutledge turned to the doctrine of Cooley. The
Cooley framework understood some areas to require national uniformity
and others to allow local variation. The question was how to tell which was
which. In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,49 Justice Rutledge
confronted that problem. Bob-Lo concerned the constitutionality of
43. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
44. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 232.
45. See Lester E. Mosher, Mr. Justice Rutledge's Philosophy of the Commerce Clause,
27 NYU L. Rev. 218, 221 & n.19 (1952); see also Fowler V. Harper, Justice Rutledge and
the Bright Constellation 290 (1965) (discussing Justice Rutledge's embrace of the Cooley
framework).
46. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439 n.52 (1946) (quoting Frederick
D.G. Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce 211 (1937) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-83 (1992) (expressing
skepticism about such federal-state collusion).
47. Mosher, supra note 45, at 228; see also id. at 227 ("Justice Rutledge's opinion in the
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line case gives full play for state power to work in coordination
with federal authority, thereby indirectly giving new power to the states and supplementing
that of Congress in the field of commerce.").
48. See id at 246 ("Justice Rutledge favored a liberal view of state power coexisting
with broad congressional authority. He therefore sought to accommodate as fully as possible
both national and local interests.").
49. 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
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Michigan's civil rights statute, as applied to a company providing boating
services between Michigan and an island in Canadian waters. One
possibility would be to divide state from national authority based on
categorical determinations of subject matter. Justice Rutledge rejected that
approach and instead looked to the nature of the regulation and whether it
aligned with national policy. A regulation in accordance with federal policy
was permissible. A regulation that conflicted with federal policy was not.
Thus, Michigan could ban discrimination in interstate commerce because
that law accorded with national policy. 50
In dissent, Justice Robert H. Jackson and Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
objected that under the Commerce Clause, the permissibility of the state
regulation could not turn on the substantive policy it reflected. 5 1 For them
the state's power to regulate this kind of commerce must depend on the
subject matter at issue, not whether the regulation accorded with national
policy. For Justice Rutledge, the state law's conformity with federal policy
was indeed the key issue. Federalism provided a way for states and the
national government to pursue shared goals. Federalism was not an
invitation to states to carve out protected enclaves of deviation from
national policies. In a biographical sketch of Justice Rutledge, Justice
Stevens noted Justice Rutledge's rejection of this kind of categorical
formalism in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 52
C. Justice Stevens and Justice Rutledge
Justice Stevens frequently has cited Justice Rutledge as setting forth the
definitive account of the Commerce Clause. Writing for an en banc United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1975, Justice Stevens
provided an extensive quotation from Justice Rutledge's book as a
statement of the "central purpose" of the Commerce Clause. 53 In opinions
on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens also has quoted Justice
Rutledge as the guide to understanding the Commerce Clause.54
For Justice Stevens, as for Justice Rutledge, the Commerce Clause
provided the solution to the primary problem faced by the framers at the
Constitutional Convention, how to bring the nation together. Justice
Stevens has argued that the nationalizing purpose of the Commerce Clause
should lead to a broad interpretation of congressional power.55  That
50. See id at 40.
51. See id. at 43 (Jackson, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., dissenting) ("The sphere of a
state's power has not been thought to expand or contract because of the policy embodied in a
particular regulation.").
52. John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Mr. Justice 177, 189 (Allison Dunham &
Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956).
53. See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 58 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
54. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 665 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See EEOC, 460 U.S at 246-47 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A]s the needs of a
dynamic and constantly expanding national economy have changed, this Court has construed
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conception of the Commerce Clause as a doctrine of empowerment, rather
than as one of limitation, informs Justice Stevens's federalism
jurisprudence.
Further following Justice Rutledge, Justice Stevens generally has
embraced the concurrent exercise of state and federal power. In a striking
indication of his rejection of dualism, he has referred to the governmental
structure in the United States as "our constitutional system of cooperative
federalism." 56
III. FEDERALISM DOCTRINE OF JUSTICE STEVENS
The jurisprudence of Justice Stevens illustrates the application of an
interactive understanding of federalism. A variety of theories could account
for Justice Stevens's votes in particular cases. With regard to some topics,
such as the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Stevens's approach may
coincide with a dual federalist framework. In other areas, such as the scope
of national authority under the Commerce Clause, Justice Stevens's
positions align with those who reject federalism altogether. 57 As a whole
though, I contend that Justice Stevens's approach corresponds to an
interactive framework.
A. Scope of Federal Regulatory Power
From the perspective of interactive federalism, questions about the scope
of national power present easy questions for courts. Courts are simply not
in the business of drawing boundaries around federal power. Congress is
much better equipped than the courts to assess whether the national
government should intervene or should let the states decide whether and
how to regulate.
1. Commerce Clause
In accordance with the interactive perspective, Justice Stevens dissented
in United States v. Lopez58 and United States v. Morrison,59 both of which
held that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause. In his dissent in Lopez, Justice Stevens specified his
agreement with Justice David H. Souter's critique of the majority's efforts
the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers of the Constitution-to confer a
power on the National Government adequate to discharge its central mission.").
56. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979).
57. Dean Edward Rubin has offered several attacks on contemporary theories of
federalism. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America,
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., March 2001, at 37; Edward L. Rubin, The
Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1009 (1997); Edward
L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
Rev. 903 (1994). Dean Rubin claims to be attacking federalism in general. I believe that his
arguments are better understood as criticisms of dualist federalism.
58. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
59. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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to reinvigorate dual federalism. 60 Justice Souter criticized the majority for
creating new categories that were difficult to apply, such as
commercial/noncommercial and educational/commercial, in place of the
old, rejected categories of direct/indirect and commerce/manufacturing. 61
Justice Stevens also dissented in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,62 a statutory
construction case with strong Commerce Clause overtones. Though the
case turned on an issue of statutory construction, the Court adopted a
narrow reading of the Clean Water Act in part because of concerns that a
broader interpretation would involve unconstitutional federal regulation of
noncommercial activity. 63 In his dissent, Justice Stevens relied heavily on
theories of the political process. He noted that the statute at issue made
provisions for local control, allowing states to substitute their regulatory
schemes for those of the federal government. 64 Thus the political process
had accommodated the federalism concern by allowing for an interplay of
state and federal regulation. Judicial interference was not required. Justice
Stevens further argued that given the nature of environmental concerns,
federal leadership made sense. He noted the problem of "externalities" in
the environmental area, in which benefits may be disproportionately local
and costs borne by citizens in other states.65
Indeed, Justice Stevens's opinion in SWANCC provided an encapsulation
of the interactive position. The Court in SWANCC proceeded on its dualist
project of seeking to divide the local from the national by means of artificial
categories, such commercial and noncommercial. Justice Stevens asserted
that such attempts were conceptually incoherent and failed to acknowledge
the realities of nature, or of the state political process. Instead, he urged the
Court to get out of the way of the national political process, which was
advancing a more realistic notion of federalism that eschewed artificial
boundaries.
Most recently, Justice Stevens was able to assign himself the majority
opinion in Gonzales v. Raich,66 upholding the power of the national
government to reach marijuana grown at home for medical use. Justice
Stevens restated Justice Rutledge's emphasis on the Commerce Clause as
the nationalizing solution to the primary problem motivating the
Constitutional Convention: "The Commerce Clause emerged as the
Framers' response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution
itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of
Confederation." 67
60. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 627-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
63. See id. at 173-74.
64. See id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 195.
66. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
67. Id. at 2205.
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In Raich, Justice Stevens also confronted the argument that California's
policy of allowing limited, medical use of marijuana served to immunize
the activity from federal regulation. For Justice Stevens, this argument
sounded in long-rejected theories of dual federalism. The argument
conjured the image of brave state pioneers carefully fencing in a small piece
of territory and seeking to manage their own destiny on their own little plot
of earth. From an interactive perspective, federalism does not operate that
way. Regulatory authority is not divided into regions with boundaries
between state and federal governance. Rather, state activity cannot possibly
displace federal law. States simply cannot carve out protected enclaves of
authority.68
In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor relied on the rhetoric of
dualist federalism. She wrote of the need to "protect historic spheres of
state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment. '69  She also
referenced the classic federalist trope of states as laboratories,
experimenting with novel social arrangements. 70  From an interactive
perspective, experiments are fine, but someone must supervise the lab. The
subjects of the experiments are humans. Moreover, the experiment may
involve dangerous substances which could harm others if the substance
escaped from the lab. For matters such as these, involving both threats to
human welfare and interstate effects, interactive federalism allows the
national government to decide whether the experiment can proceed. In
subsequent comments, Justice Stevens made clear that, as a policy matter,
he personally believed California should be able to proceed with its
experiment, but the decision lay with Congress, not with the Court.71
2. "Commandeering" Cases
Cases purporting to limit federal power to regulate "states as states" or to
"commandeer" state administrative and legislative functions have proved
similarly easy for Justice Stevens. In accordance with the interactive
approach, Justice Stevens has denied that considerations of state
sovereignty place any limits on the scope of federal power. 72 This area
68. Seeid. at 2212-13.
69. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 2220-21 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
71. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. Times,
Aug. 25, 2005, at Al. With regard to other federal regulatory programs as well, Justice
Stevens has voiced policy-based disagreements, while voting to uphold the exercise of
national power. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (criticizing, while voting to uphold, legislative prohibition of mandatory
retirement); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 881 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing, while voting to uphold, a minimum wage law).
72. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Nat'7
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). From an interactive perspective,
it is important that states remain as independent centers of regulatory authority. Thus, an
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presents valuable illustrations of the divergence in perspectives between a
dualist and an interactive approach to federalism. The differing visions of
government and of ensuring government accountability emerge as
especially significant.
Justice Stevens has been a strong adherent of the "political safeguards of
federalism," a view which understands the political process, rather than the
courts, as the primary protector of the role of states in the federal system.
Justice Stevens joined Justice Harry Blackmun's majority opinion relying
on the political safeguards approach in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.73 Justice Stevens recently referred to Garcia as the
opinion by Justice Blackmun that he most admires, 74 and he has relied on
the political safeguards approach in several of his own opinions. 75
For dualist federalism, the political safeguards approach has little
plausibility. One of the key models underlying dualism understands states
as firms competing in a policy market. From that perspective, states might
collude and induce the national government to mandate uniform policies,
thus relieving states of the burdens of policy competition. Alternatively, the
federal government has its own policy consumers, both local citizens and
national interest groups. To serve its customers, the federal government
may simply override the wishes of the states.76 Along these lines, the
members of Congress may ignore the interests of their home states and
instead become subject to the influence of national interests. 77
attempt by the federal government to eliminate the ability of states to enact laws would raise
serious federalism concerns. However, none of the challenged federal actions in these cases
came close to destroying the ability of states to develop their own policies. Of course,
individual state policies may be displaced by federal law, but that result reflects principles of
federal supremacy underlying the federal system in the United States. As James Gardner has
demonstrated, even when it is displaced by federal law, state law still can play a significant
role in the federal system. James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A
Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System 186-94 (2005).
73. 469 U.S. 528.
74. See John Paul Stevens, "Random Recollections, " 42 San Diego L. Rev. 269, 280
(2005). Justice Stevens apparently appreciated both the substantive content of the opinion
and its candor in noting that Justice Harry Blackmun had provided the fifth vote in National
League of Cities, which Garcia overruled.
75. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Printz, 521 U.S. at 951 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,
2210 n.34 (2005) (noting "political checks that would generally curb Congress' power to
enact a broad and comprehensive scheme for the purpose of targeting purely local activity").
76. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 223-24 (2000) ("Federal politicians will want to earn
the support and gratitude of local constituents by providing desired services themselves-
through the federal government-rather than giving or sharing credit with state officials.
State officials are rivals, not allies .... ").
77. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); William T. Mayton,
"The Fate of Lesser Voices ": Calhoun v. Wechsler on Federalism, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1083, 1103-04 (1997) (describing importance of a "federal majority" as opposed to state and
local interests).
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The Justices on the United States Supreme Court who adopt a dualist
perspective articulate these concerns using the language of accountability.
They argue that unless the lines between state and federal authority are
clearly drawn, citizens will lose the ability to hold the proper officials
accountable. 78 Within this mindset, which posits a confused electorate,
federal commandeering of state regulatory and administrative functions
becomes especially pernicious. Having state officials exercise federal
commands presents a great danger of confusion. In accordance with this
model of governance, Justice O'Connor has expressed a specific concern
that government officials may invite an unconstitutional blending of power
so as to reduce their accountability for their unpopular decisions.79 These
criticisms of the political safeguards theory and the attendant concern with
ensuring accountability through clearly demarcated spheres of authority
serve to illuminate the models of governance underlying the dualist
perspective.
Justice Stevens understands government and the democratic process in
quite different terms. Many different models of governance are consistent
with interactive federalism. Justice Stevens illustrates one such approach.
His conception rejects the narrow public choice model that underlies the
economic account of federalism.
Justice Stevens frequently cites the duty to govern "impartially." 80 He
clearly believes that that duty can be fulfilled. His view implies that
governing involves something other than selling policy positions in return
for campaign contributions or other favors. He has expressed confidence in
the idea that legislators can be "disinterested and fully informed."'81 Justice
Stevens certainly understands the pitfalls of governmental corruption, but
he believes that impartial governance is an attainable goal. His strong
support for campaign finance regulation, in the face of First Amendment
78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires for its realization
two distinct and discernable lines of political accountability ...."); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (.'Were the Federal Government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the
regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur .... .- (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)));
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal Government
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished."). Dean Edward Rubin recently presented a cogent critique of this
accountability argument. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2083-91 (2005).
79. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83.
80. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 951 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281 (1999); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1039 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 323 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36, 62 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636 n.2
(1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,452 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
81. John Paul Stevens, "Two Questions About Justice," 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 821, 827.
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challenges, indicates his awareness of the problems of corruption and his
belief that the problems can be addressed. 82 Within Justice Stevens's
conception, the political process can indeed function properly, and the
national political process can reflect the interests of all the people. In his
dissent in Printz v. United States, Justice Stevens asserted that recent
political developments proved the effectiveness of the political safeguards
thesis.83
Similarly, Justice Stevens gives little credence to the fear of states and
the national government conspiring to impose a policy cartel. For him, as
for Justice Rutledge, the point of constitutional federalism may be to
resolve disputes between state and national authority, but it is never to
prevent the states and the national government from agreeing on a particular
course. Consistent with his acceptance of the political safeguards of
federalism, Justice Stevens believes that the states and the federal
government generally can be trusted to represent their constituents. 84
B. Scope of Judicial Jurisdiction
Justice Stevens's broad view of the scope of national power accords with
a variety of approaches to federalism, including a thoroughgoing
nationalism that rejects constitutional principles of federalism entirely.
Justice Stevens's views of judicial federalism show more clearly his
interactive conception. As in the area of regulatory authority, Justice
Stevens generally endorses concurrent exercises of judicial authority. With
regard to courts, as with legislatures, Justice Stevens's jurisprudence
illustrates how the goals of federalism can be advanced by harnessing the
overlap of state and federal jurisdiction, rather than by trying rigidly to
separate the two systems.
1. Sovereign Immunity/Eleventh Amendment
As the Court's Commerce Clause and "commandeering" jurisprudence
corresponds to its dualist outlook, so too does its approach to sovereign
immunity. In the name of accountability, the Court creates enclaves of state
governance protected from federal regulatory intrusion. Similarly, the
Court builds walls protecting state governments from federal judicial
jurisdiction. With regard to both regulatory and judicial jurisdiction, the
Court insists that good fences make good neighbors.
As Justice Stevens illustrates, interactive federalism adopts exactly the
opposite approach. From an interactive perspective, accountability remains
82. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
83. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 957-58 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995).
84. Cf Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439 n.52 (1946) (Rutledge, J.)
('It would be a shocking thing, if state and federal governments acting together were
prevented from achieving the end desired by both, simply because of the division of power
between them."' (quoting Ribble, supra note 46, at 211)).
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important, but accountability comes not from limiting regulatory
jurisdiction, but from expanding judicial jurisdiction. Concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction allows multiple governments, state and federal, to
address important concerns. Similarly, concurrent judicial jurisdiction
fosters multiple avenues for redress should governments or their agents
violate the law.
Justice Stevens has summarized this view of accountability as follows:
"In my opinion all Governments-federal, state, and tribal-should
generally be accountable for their illegal conduct. ' 85 It is the job of courts
to hold officials accountable. Accordingly, Justice Stevens generally
opposes all judicial immunities. 86
I have reviewed Justice Stevens's sovereign immunity jurisprudence
elsewhere. 87 From the perspective of interactive federalism, three points
deserve emphasis. First, judicial federalism provides a valuable means for
holding governments accountable. Federal courts can help to ensure that
states abide by federal law. Second, to the extent that interactive federalism
does not understand states as integral communities of value, the policy
arguments supporting state sovereign immunity become especially weak.
In conferring sovereign immunity on the states, the Court expressed
concern lest monetary judgments interfere with states' policy discretion.
However, valid federal law expresses national policy. Interactive
federalism does not license states to pursue policies at odds with such
national policy judgments. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Justice Stevens
places this argument in the language of sovereignty: "In this country the
sovereignty of the individual States is subordinate both to the citizenry of
each State and to the supreme law of the federal sovereign. '88 Third,
Justice Stevens acknowledges that federalism or more general policy
concerns might justify conferring immunity on states in certain classes of
cases. In accordance with Justice Stevens's general reliance on the political
process, though, he insists that it is up to Congress, not the Court, to make
that decision. 89
2. Intersystemic Adjudication
Interactive federalism embraces the concurrent exercise of state and
federal judicial power. The dual judicial system in the United States
provides broad opportunities for such concurrent jurisdiction. Federal
85. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
514 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. See Robert A. Schapiro, Balancing, Justice, and the Eleventh Amendment: Justice
Stevens' Theory of State Sovereign Immunity, 27 Rutgers L.J. 563, 566-67 (1996) (describing
Justice Stevens's hostility to federal sovereign immunity, state sovereign immunity, official
immunity for public officers, foreign sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity for
Indian tribes). Similarly, Justice Stevens rejected the idea that states should enjoy immunity
in the courts of other states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
87. See generally Schapiro, supra note 86.
88. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 98 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 98-99.
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courts often apply state law. State courts apply federal law, as well as the
law of other states. I have used the term intersystemic adjudication to
describe the general phenomenon of courts applying the law of a different
political system.90 Intersystemic adjudication is pervasive in the federalist
system in the United States, and from the interactive perspective,
intersystemic adjudication provides a significant opportunity to advance the
goals of federalism.
Intersystemic adjudication raises intricate jurisdictional questions. While
some amount of intersystemic adjudication is deeply embedded in the
United States,91 jurisdictional standards regulate the extent of intersystemic
adjudication. Federal statutes provide some rules, but most of the
jurisdictional principles are judicially fashioned. Deciding the scope of
intersystemic adjudication raises issues of federalism.
The dualist and the interactive models present different frameworks from
which to analyze the issues. From the dualist perspective, state and federal
courts serve as agents of different sovereigns. Intersystemic adjudication
therefore constitutes a suspect exercise. Applying the law of a different
sovereign raises questions of interpretation and of legitimacy. Courts may
not understand the law of a different sovereign. Further, the decisions may
result in the failure of accountability that dualism fears with regard to
legislative jurisdiction. People may not understand that the agent of one
sovereign is applying the law of a different sovereign. They may be
confused about where to place the blame. The ideas, sometimes associated
with legal realism and positivism, that courts participate in the making of
the law provide further grounds for caution. Intersystemic adjudication
involves the agents of one sovereign making the law of a different
sovereign.92
Intersystemic adjudication constitutes a fairly widespread phenomenon.
The field of conflict of law recognizes that courts may apply the law of
other polities. Nevertheless, from the dual federalist perspective,
intersystemic adjudication needs to be cabined carefully. For interactive
federalism, by contrast, intersystemic adjudication may provide valuable
opportunities for plural interpretation and redundancy. Interactive
federalism recognizes the pitfalls of intersystemic adjudication, but it also
understands the potential value. In a variety of areas, Justice Stevens's
jurisprudence embraces intersystemic adjudication, consistent with the
framework of interactive federalism.
90. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World,
46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1399 (2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Interjurisdictional
Enforcement]; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the
Federal Courts, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1409, 1466-67 (1999) [hereinafter Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism].
91. Examples include diversity jurisdiction and state courts' deciding federal law issues
arising in the course of state-law matters, including criminal prosecutions.
92. See Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement, supra note 90, at 1423-27.
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a. Federal Law in State Court: State Courts Serving the National Interest
i. Michigan v. Long
Justice Stevens's dissent in Michigan v. Long 93 represents a forceful
statement of the interactive position. Justice Stevens considers the claims
of uniformity and hierarchical accountability, but he ends up siding with
plurality and redundancy.
The issue in Long was the standard for deciding when a state court
decision rests on adequate and independent state-law grounds. The United
States Supreme Court long has refused to assert jurisdiction over decisions
of state courts that hinge on issues of state law. Even if federal issues are
present in the cases, the Court will not review the case if the state-law
matter is determinative.
In Long, the Michigan Supreme Court had cited both state and federal
authority in support of its holding. The United States Supreme Court had to
decide whether the decision rested on adequate and independent state
grounds. Seeking to provide clarity in this area, the majority adopted a
presumption that state-court decisions citing federal law do not rest on
adequate and independent state grounds unless the state-court opinion
clearly so states.94 If the opinion mentions both state and federal law
without specifying the state-law ground as dispositive, then the United
States Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction and determine any federal
issues raised by the case.
The majority emphasized the desirability of exercising review over state
court decisions arguably resting on federal grounds. The Court stressed the
importance of ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.95
The Court expressed concern over the confusion that might arise if state
court opinions potentially resting on federal law were deemed unreviewable
merely because state-law grounds were mentioned. A refusal to review
such decisions would allow potentially erroneous discussions of federal law
to persist.
Justice Stevens wrote a strong dissent, insisting that the Supreme Court
should not adopt a presumption of reviewability. He recognized the
potential for lack of uniform interpretation of federal law. In an article
published one year before Long, however, Justice Stevens made clear that
the uniformity of federal law did not stand as an overriding imperative. In
accordance with the interactive approach, he even suggested that a certain
amount of diversity might serve a valuable purpose. Federalism allowed
varying perspectives on how to implement federal policy. Indeed, Justice
93. 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 1040-4 1.
95. Id. at 1040 ("[I]t cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in
federal law ... ").
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Stevens accepted the idea that federal law might even vary among federal
courts. Justice Stevens wrote,
I would like to suggest, first, that the existence of differing rules of law in
different sections of our great country is not always an intolerable
evil .... [T]he fact that many rules of law differ from state to state is at
times one of the virtues of our federal system. It would be better, of
course, if federal law could be applied uniformly in all federal courts, but
experience with conflicting interpretations of federal rules may help to
illuminate an issue before it is finally resolved and thus may play a
constructive role in the lawmaking process. 96
In light of these principles, Justice Stevens found that the goal of
uniformity did not justify reviewing a state court judgment upholding a
claim of federal right.97 As he made clear in later opinions, Justice Stevens
understood the jurisdictional structure to establish the vindication of federal
rights as a higher priority than the uniformity of federal law. 98
To illustrate his point, Justice Stevens deployed a somewhat startling
example. Justice Stevens compared the State of Michigan to the Republic
of Finland. If Finland brought a criminal prosecution against an American
citizen, but ended up acquitting the American based on the Finnish court's
understanding of the United States Constitution, the United States would
have no reason to complain. 99 So too, Justice Stevens argued, the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision to release Long threatened no federal interest.
Academic defenders of the majority's position in Long decry both the
potential disuniformity and lack of accountability that might flow from
Justice Stevens's approach. 10 0 In the system Justice Stevens advocates,
federal law might have different meanings in different states. Finland and
Italy might develop different understandings of United States law, and so
might Michigan and Florida. Further, the Stevens approach might insulate
the state courts from hierarchical accountability. The state court
interpretation of federal law would remain immune from federal review.
The state courts also might avoid review of their decisions by the state
political process. By appearing to rely on federal law, the state judges
might deflect scrutiny from state law. The citizens of a state can exert
control over the law of the state, but only if they know which law is driving
the decisions with which they disagree.' 0'
96. John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 183
(1982).
97. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1070-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695-97 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068.
100. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485 (1987) [hereinafter Althouse, Separate Sphere]; Ann
Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42
Duke L.J. 979 (1993) [hereinafter Althouse, Normative Federalism]; Thomas E. Baker, The
Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along
a Mdbius Strip, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 799, 853-56 (1985)
101. See Althouse, Normative Federalism, supra note 100, at 988-89.
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For Justice Stevens, the federal policy of protecting the rights of
individuals predominates. States are free to explore different ways to
preserve those rights. State and federal law and state and federal courts
may provide redundant levels of protection. That plurality and redundancy
is how federalism helps to preserve rights. The citizens of the state remain
free to change the law, either increasing or decreasing the level of state
protection.
On first analysis, Justice Stevens's reference to Finland might appear to
represent an extreme expression of dualist federalism. Justice Stevens
likens a state to a foreign nation. To ascribe to Michigan the autonomy and
sovereignty of a foreign country suggests a model of jurisdictional
exclusiveness. The United States and Finland have largely nonoverlapping
realms of regulatory jurisdiction. If that international model provides the
paradigm for state-federal relations in the United States, then strong
boundaries between state and federal power might well be appropriate. The
integrity of a foreign nation must be respected.
In the context of the opinion, however, the comparison to Finland
actually does not support a dualist approach. On the contrary, the reference
to Finland embraces the postulates of the interactive perspective. In the
example Justice Stevens uses, it is clear that the overall system he describes
has little interest in the autonomy of Finland. Finland is a means toward the
end of protecting the rights of citizens of the United States. As long as
Finland safeguards those citizens, the United States has no interest in the
functioning of the Finnish system. The concern that the misinterpretation
of United States law might impede sovereign interests of Finland plays no
role whatsoever in the analysis.
The point of the example is not to emphasize the sovereignty of Finland
or of Michigan, but to stress that the interest of United States lies in
protecting its citizens, not in protecting the autonomy of states, be they
Finland or Michigan. The first priority in the interactive framework is for
the interaction of state and federal law to advance any relevant national
policy. States function to provide alternative means of realizing largely
shared goals. Federalism does not empower states to develop conflicting
policy initiatives. The primacy of protecting national interests appears
sharply in the contrast between Long and Harris v. Reed.102 In Harris, the
state court had rejected the claim of federal right. In such instances, Justice
Stevens agreed that the presumption of federal reviewability should attach.
State courts should be free to develop their own means for protecting the
national rights of citizens, but they enjoyed no autonomy in rejecting those
rights. 10 3
102. 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
103. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe that in reviewing the
decisions of state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek
to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard.").
2006) 2157
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
ii. Howlett v. Rose
In understanding states as loci of power, rather than as integral
communities of value, interactive federalism acknowledges the dominance
of a variety of national policies. States provide different approaches to
vindicating those policies. States offer choice, self-governance, and
resistance to tyranny, but all within the context of an overall system in
which a shared set of fundamental values exists without regard to
geographical boundaries. Great variance may exist in how states
understand and implement these values, but this model of federalism does
not rest on a notion of a fundamental incommensurability of values.
The significance of a national set of values appears in jurisdictional
opinions in which state courts deviate from the presumptively shared social
policy. In writing for a unanimous court in Howlett v. Rose,10 4 Justice
Stevens insisted on the constitutional presumption of a shared national
policy. The issue in Howlett was whether Florida courts could refuse to
entertain certain kinds of federal civil rights suits because such actions
conflicted with Florida's policy of not allowing suits against local
government authorities.
Justice Stevens rejected the notion that Florida could have a policy
different from the national policy embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He stated,
"When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States,
and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy
of [the State] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and
should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State." 10 5
Federalism did not license states to dissent from national policies. Indeed, a
conflict between state and national policies cannot really exist because at a
fundamental level, national policies and state policies must be consistent.
In Howlett, Justice Stevens described the role of state courts in the
federal system. At one level, the description seems in tension with the
analogy to Finnish courts in Long. In Howlett, Justice Stevens wrote,
"[State and federal law] together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two
jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other
as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly
different and partly concurrent."10 6
The courts of Michigan are no longer like the courts of Finland. State and
federal courts are now emphatically courts of the same country.
Though the nominal description of state courts in Howlett contrasts with
that in Long, no conceptual tension exists. As discussed above, in the
104. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
105. Id. at 371 (quoting Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1,
57 (1912)).
106. Id. at 367 (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876)).
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overall context of Long, the reference to Finland in no way implied
regulatory autonomy. Indeed, quite the contrary inference was intended.
Just as the United States does not care how Finland applies American law,
as long as it protects American citizens, so the United States does not care
how Michigan applies American law, as long as it protects American
citizens. Howlett makes patent the key point that a state has no ability to
define narrowly the rights of citizens. The states cannot undermine federal
rights; they can just enforce them in different ways.
Johnson v. Fankell107 provides a further illustration of Justice Stevens's
position that state courts should enjoy broad independence, as long as they
respect the broad outlines of federal policy. Johnson addressed the kind of
procedural question produced by broad concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction. The issue was whether state courts were required to allow an
interlocutory appeal of a trial court's rejection of a defense of qualified
immunity in a § 1983 civil rights action. As the procedural law of
immunity had developed in federal court, an immediate appeal was
available as a way of giving full force to the immunity. In prior decisions,
the United States Supreme Court had emphasized that the immunity was an
immunity to suit, not just an ordinary defense on the merits. 10 8 The Court
had conceptualized the defense as a way to grant necessary protections to
government officials. In Johnson, the state official argued that the right to
interlocutory appeal formed part of the fabric of § 1983, and state courts, as
well as federal courts, should be required to recognize it.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens refused to impose the
requirement of interlocutory appeal on state courts. For Justice Stevens, the
case presented an instance of a state potentially overprotecting federal
rights. Justice Stevens characterized the purpose of qualified immunity as
protecting states and their officials from the "overenforcement" of federal
rights. 10 9  If states did not wish to protect themselves from this
overenforcement, they were free to make that choice. In short, qualified
immunity was for the benefit of states, and if they did not wish to take full
advantage of it, they need not do so. Justice Stevens once again presented
his vision of a federalism that functioned by allowing diversity in state
practice, even with regard to matters subject to federal law, as long as the
states did not trench on national policy. As long as broad principles of
national policy are respected, uniformity of federal law is not essential.
iii. Nike/ASARCO
The application of federal justiciability principles to federal claims in
state courts provides another perspective on intersystemic adjudication.
Constitutional principles of justiciability trace to the Article III
requirements for federal jurisdiction. Such requirements do not generally
107. 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
108. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985).
109. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 919.
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bind state courts. With regard to federal questions, however, some scholars
have urged a different approach. Commentators have noted that allowing
state courts to hear federal claims in non-Article III cases raises the
possibility of lack of uniformity and an absence of hierarchical
accountability. "10
The Article III requirements, such as standing, ripeness, and lack of
mootness, clearly apply to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, if state courts
hear federal claims that do not fit within Article III, review of the federal
issue in the Supreme Court may not be available. With regard to cases
falling outside the scope of Article III, state courts would be rendering
unreviewable interpretations of federal law. Courts in different states might
interpret the federal law in divergent ways, and the Supreme Court could
not reconcile the conflict. One important function of the Supreme Court is
to provide a final, uniform, authoritative interpretation of federal law."'1
That role would be thwarted. Further, the unreviewable state court
judgments might lack preclusive effect in subsequent federal litigation." 12
Finality, uniformity, and hierarchical accountability all would suffer.
The Supreme Court has developed a partial solution to this problem of
losing control over the development of federal law. In ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish,1 13 the Court held that if a non-Article III plaintiff succeeds in
vindicating a federal right, the state court judgment is subject to review in
the Supreme Court. In effect, being subject to an adverse decision on a
matter of federal law gives Article III standing to the original defendant.
State court judgments rejecting the federal right, however, do not give rise
to Supreme Court jurisdiction. In those instances, the state courts have the
last word on federal law, at least in that case.
Because of the lack of uniformity, finality, and hierarchical
accountability, some scholars have suggested a jurisdictional fix, consisting
of requiring state courts to follow federal rules of justiciability when
considering federal claims. 114 The Supreme Court, however, has not
indicated support for imposing federal justiciability rules on state courts.
For his part, Justice Stevens has defended such state court exercises of
jurisdiction.
110. See Supreme Court and Supreme Law 35 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (remarks of
Professor Paul Freund); William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in
State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 263, 283-84 (1990).
111. See William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review ofAbstract State Court Decisions on
Federal Law: A Justiciability Analysis, 25 St. Louis U. L.J. 473, 497-98 (1981)
(emphasizing the importance of uniform interpretation of federal law); Martin H. Redish &
John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev.
311, 332 (1976) (same); Jonathan D. Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power
Case, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 273, 311-12 (1980) (same).
112. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 274-75, 285 (discussing the implications of Fidelity
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927)).
113. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
114. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 282-83.
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Justice Stevens often has noted that justiciability requirements applicable
in federal court do not bind state courts. 1 5 He is willing to abide the
consequences that state courts may issue unreviewable judgments on issues
of federal law. Justice Stevens did join in the ASARCO opinion, allowing
Supreme Court review of state court decisions favorable to non-Article III
plaintiffs. However, in his opinion in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 116 he resisted the
expansion of the ASARCO doctrine to include interlocutory rulings allowing
the trial to proceed. He felt no compulsion to review every state court
judgment resting on issues of federal law.
iv. Merrell Dow
The scope of federal question jurisdiction constitutes another area in
which intersystemic adjudication confronts claims of uniformity.
Determining when actions "arise under" federal law and thus come within
the general federal question jurisdiction of lower federal courts has been a
source of continuing controversy. 117 The treatment of state law claims that
raise significant federal issues has proven especially vexing. In some
instances, the Supreme Court has allowed such actions to be heard by lower
federal courts. 11 8 In other instances, the Court has decided that lower
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. 119
Whether the cases proceed in state or federal court, the Supreme Court
will have jurisdiction to review the federal issues on appeal. However,
given the rarity of the Supreme Court's granting certiorari, if these actions
proceed in state court, then state courts will, as a practical matter, have the
final say on issues of federal law.
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,120 the Supreme
Court confronted this issue. Consumers had brought state-law claims in
state court against the manufacturer of Bendectin, alleging that the drug
caused birth defects. The consumers asserted that the manufacturer's
violation of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")
constituted negligence. Based on that federal issue, the manufacturer
sought to remove the case to federal court.
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Stevens held that the lower
federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In dissent, Justice William
Brennan emphasized the important interest in having federal issues decided
in federal court. Arguing for a broader interpretation of the federal question
statute, he stressed that allowing the case to be heard in federal court would
115. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999); Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 101 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Sec'y of State of Md. v. J.H. Munson Co.,
467 U.S. 947, 971 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
117. See Richard D. Freer, Introduction to Civil Procedure § 4.6.4, at 197-201 (2006).
118. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005);
Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
119. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
120. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
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help to ensure a uniform interpretation of federal law. 121 Justice Stevens
rejected these pleas for uniformity.
The disagreement between Justices Stevens and Brennan turned in part
on their understanding of the underlying federal statutory regime. Justice
Stevens interpreted the statute to embody a congressional desire to keep
private FDCA actions out of federal court. He understood the
congressional design to contemplate intersystemic adjudication, with state
courts hearing such claims. 122 To Justice Brennan, such a preference for
intersystemic adjudication made no sense. 123 Especially in view of the
important interest in uniformity, he refused to interpret the legislative
scheme as preferring state-court adjudication of FDCA issues. For Justice
Stevens, the congressional choice of intersystemic adjudication was
plausible, and no overriding interest in uniformity undermined that
interpretation.
b. State Law in Federal Courts
The ability of state courts to interpret federal law reflects another facet of
intersystemic adjudication. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,124 Justice Stevens forcefully defended the propriety of
intersystemic adjudication. That case concerned the ability of a federal
court to grant an injunction against a state official based on state law.
In accordance with principles established in Ex parte Young, 125 state
sovereign immunity does not prevent an injunctive action against a state
official based on federal law. In Pennhurst, the lower federal courts had
relied on the reasoning of Ex parte Young to approve an injunction against a
state official based on state law. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that
the principles of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited a federal court from issuing an injunction against a
state official based on state law.
In many ways, Pennhurst was the flip side of Michigan v. Long.126 For
the majority in Long, a presumption against adequate and independent state
grounds furthered important principles of uniformity and accountability.
Unreviewed state court comments on federal law might promote different
understandings of federal law in different states. Further, state courts might
be able to deflect responsibility for their decisions by appearing to rely on
federal law, when in fact state law determined the outcome. The Long
presumption forced state courts to make clear whether their opinions rested
121. See id. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 811-12 (majority opinion).
123. See id. at 829-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
125. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
126. For a discussion of the interplay of Pennhurst and Michigan v. Long, see generally
Althouse, Separate Sphere, supra note 100.
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on state or federal bases and also facilitated federal review of state court
interpretations of federal law.
Pennhurst performed a similar function with regard to federal court
interpretations of state law. When a federal court relies on state law, it
creates non-authoritative interpretations of state law. These rulings may
create confusion about the actual content of state law. Such decisions also
may confuse the citizens of the state about whom to hold accountable for
unpopular rulings. When a federal court issues an injunction based on state
law, disgruntled citizens may not know whether to blame the federal
government or the state government. In addition, given the relative
infrequency of Supreme Court review of federal court interpretations of
state law, 127 reliance on state law may effectively insulate a federal court's
rulings from Supreme Court supervision.
As Justice Stevens has shown in a variety of areas, he does not find the
concern for uniform interpretation of law to be especially persuasive. 128
Further, for Justice Stevens, accountability means the ability to obtain
meaningful legal redress against defendants, including state agencies, who
are acting in violation of law. The Pennhurst decision diminishes that
accountability by denying plaintiffs the ability to advance state and federal
claims together in federal court. A plaintiff wishing to pursue the federal
claims in federal court must bring a separate action in state court to litigate
the state claims. Such claim-splitting entails expense, inconvenience, and
the hazards of possible preclusion. To avoid the problems accompanying
splitting the state and federal claims, the plaintiff may feel compelled to
bring both state and federal claims in state court.
For Justice Stevens, however, plaintiffs should not be forced to bring
their dual claims in state court. In Justice Stevens's view, state and federal
courts are not necessarily equal. Congress has established a national policy
allowing plaintiffs to bring federal claims in federal courts. For him, the
Supreme Court should promote that policy, rather than impede it. Nor
should permitting federal courts to apply state law to state officers infringe
upon any legitimate state interest. From the interactive perspective, this
kind of intersystemic adjudication fulfills the function of federalism. State
and federal courts provide redundant means for enforcing state law. Surely
the state has no legitimate interest in allowing the state law governing state
officials to go underenforced because of formalistic jurisdictional
hurdles. 129
127. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 144 (1996) ("[W]e do not normally grant
petitions for certiorari solely to review what purports to be an application of state law .....
128. See Stevens, supra note 96, at 183.
129. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the state's
"interest lies with those who seek to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated
them").
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3. Applying Forum Law to Out-of-State Parties
In most disputes about the appropriateness of intersystemic adjudication,
the issue is primarily choice of forum, not choice of law. It is clear what
law is going to apply; the question concerns the choice of appropriate
forum. Is it proper for the courts of one political system to interpret the law
of another political system or should litigants be directed to courts of the
system whose law is being applied? Thus, in Pennhurst the issue was
whether litigants could bring their supplemental state-law claims in federal
court or whether they would instead be remitted to state court.
Sometimes instead, the choice of forum is clear, and the question
concerns what law will be applied to the dispute. For a dualist, the forum
state's application of its own law to a multistate dispute threatens to impair
the sovereignty of another state. An aspect of the autonomy of states is
their ability to have their own law applied to disputes with which they have
the most significant contacts. Moreover, given the dualist presumption of
fundamental divergence among states, the application of one state's law
presumptively impairs the regulatory interest of another state. Strict federal
supervision of states' choice-of-law decisions is necessary to protect the
sovereignty of other states.
Consistent with the interactive conception of states as alternative sources
of power, rather than as integral communities of value, Justice Stevens has
rejected strict limits on state courts' choice-of-law decisions. From Justice
Stevens's perspective, states do not stand as hostile sovereigns in relation to
each other; nor do state boundaries demarcate fundamental divisions of
value. Rather, states form part of a single federal system and enjoy
widespread agreement on a broad range of issues. In view of these
principles, the application of forum state law does not presumptively impair
the interests of another state.
The most dramatic choice-of-law issue of this kind concerned whether
courts in California were required to recognize the sovereign immunity
defense that Nevada would be allowed to assert in its own courts. In
Nevada v. Hall,130 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court rejecting
Nevada's pleas. His opinion found that principles of federalism simply did
not limit California's ability to apply its laws to the dispute. The case
further illustrated the potential of a federal system to provide alternative
means for redressing injuries. In state courts in Nevada, state sovereign
immunity would bar the plaintiffs recovery. The broad jurisdictional
overlap characteristic of federalism in the United States offered the plaintiff
an alternative avenue for legal redress. In Nevada v. Hall, federalism
ensured that rights would indeed have remedies. The case represents not a
threat to federalism, but a realization of the promise of federalism.
130. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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Other choice-of-law decisions also illustrate Justice Stevens's interactive
approach. In Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,131 for example, Justice Stevens
disagreed with the majority's decision to restrict the choice-of-law decision
of the Kansas courts. He doubted that the law of other states would differ
significantly from that of Kansas. Accordingly, he stated a very high
standard for overcoming the presumption of a general convergence of the
law of different states: "Rather than potential, 'putative,' or even 'likely'
conflicts, I would require demonstration of an unambiguous conflict with
the established law of another State as an essential element of a
constitutional choice-of-law claim."' 132
Similarly, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,133 Justice Stevens made
clear that a state's decision to apply its own law generally did not place a
constitutionally cognizable burden on another state. The focus of the
constitutional question should not be whether one state was violating the
prerogatives of another state, but rather whether the choice-of-law decision
undermined the overall federal system. For Justice Stevens, the question
was whether the choice-of-law decision "threatens the federal interest in
national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of
another State." 134
C. Scope of State Regulatory Authority
The areas of federal preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause
provide a significant elaboration of a theory of interactive federalism.
Belying the idea that he is a reflexive nationalist, preemption represents an
area in which Justice Stevens would give more authority to states than the
Rehnquist Court often allowed. Belying the concept that Justice Stevens
exhibits a reflexive pro-regulatory bent, his dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence demonstrates a willingness to strike down certain state
economic regulations.
1. Preemption
Preemption constitutes one of Justice Stevens's most important
contributions to federalism. Justice Stevens consistently has urged a narrow
interpretation of the preemptive force of federal laws and regulations. 135
He has sought to allow concurrent state regulation in a wide variety of
areas.
131. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
132. Id. at 841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
134. Id. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992); see also William D.
Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens,
1989 Duke L.J. 1087, 1103 & n.65 (listing cases in which Justice Stevens rejected claims of
federal preemption).
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Preemption directly presents the question of how to accommodate the
potential conflict between state and federal regulatory regimes. The cases
arise in areas in which the federal government clearly has authority to
promulgate rules and, indeed, has the power to disable states from imposing
their regulations. The key question is whether Congress has, indeed, sought
to displace the states. On the level of policy, allowing concurrent state and
federal regulation advances principles of plurality and redundancy.
Uniformity and hierarchical accountability might suffer.
Dualist federalism contains no resources for deciding whether state and
federal regulations can coexist. If the state policy implicates a commercial
area, it enjoys no protection from federal displacement. When line drawing
fails to resolve issues, the dualist approach can contribute little to answering
these kinds of federalism problems. Without any inclination to protect state
authority in these realms, the Court has struck down many state regulations
on the grounds of federal preemption. 136 With regard to preemption, dualist
federalism has been no friend of state power.
Interactive federalism accepts a region for state regulation that is much
broader than that contemplated by dualist federalism. Justice Stevens has
been at the forefront of permitting concurrent state and federal regulation,
rather than finding state law preempted. 137 He has refused to join the
Court's more aggressive action in striking down state laws that arguably
serve as obstacles to federal regulation. 138 He has chided the Court for
ignoring principles of federalism in this area. In his dissent in Geier, he
stated, "'This is a case about federalism." ' 139 In limiting the scope of
federal preemption, interactive federalism shows the value of its embrace of
concurrent state and federal authority. Justice Stevens's more limited
conception of preemption allows plurality and redundancy to flourish. Both
states and the national government are free to address social problems and
to come up with overlapping sets of solutions. Citizens can rely on both
state and federal law. If one set of laws provides inadequate protection, the
other remains available for relief.
136. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that a
California statute requiring disclosure of information about Holocaust-era insurance policies
was preempted by foreign policy of the United States); Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525 (holding that
a state statute regulating the advertising of tobacco products was preempted by federal law);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that a state law restricting state transactions
with companies doing business with Burma was preempted by the foreign policy of the
United States); Geier, 529 U.S. 861; United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding
that state regulation of oil spills was preempted by federal statute); Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that a state law regulating workers at
hazardous waste sites was preempted by federal law).
137. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (suggesting that implied preemption would not be
found in statutes containing express preemption provisions).
138. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 341; Geier, 529 U.S. at 881-82; see also Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 228-29 (2000).
139. Geier, 529 U.S. at 887 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
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2. Dormant Commerce Clause
Justice Stevens's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence poses the
greatest obstacle to characterizing his federalism as fully interactive.
Justice Stevens has supported a fairly robust form of the dormant
Commerce Clause, voting to strike down a variety of state regulations. 140
What accounts for Justice Stevens's relatively broad conception of
preemption under the dormant Commerce Clause, coupled with a narrow
understanding of preemption in the area of federal preemption?
Here the combination of Justice Rutledge's conception of the Commerce
Clause and Justice Stevens's focus on impartial governance likely proves
decisive. Recall that in Justice Rutledge's account, frequently cited by
Justice Stevens, the central purpose of the Constitution in general, and of
the Commerce Clause in particular, was to eliminate state barriers to trade.
State interference with interstate commerce constituted the principal
problem threatening the United States under the Articles of Confederation.
The Constitution was adopted to eliminate that obstacle.
Justice Stevens emphasized this view of constitutional history in his
opinion for the Court in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison.14 1 In addition to citing Justice Rutledge, Justice Stevens quoted
from Justice William Johnson's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.142 Justice
Johnson noted that before the Constitution was adopted, states could burden
commerce without regard to the costs imposed on nonresidents.
Eliminating this problem provided the impetus for the constitutional
convention and the primary goal of the Constitution. 143
The Constitution thus established the strongest possible national policy
against state interference with interstate commerce. No additional statutory
expressions of this principle are required; it pervades the constitutional
system unless specifically displaced by Congress. State regulations that
discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden it run contrary to
this fundamental national commitment. In this area, as in others, states
simply have no ability to thwart a national policy.
Justice Stevens's conception of a well-functioning political process
contributes to his embrace of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The
dormant Commerce Clause targets state regulations that impose costs on
other states. This kind of cost-exporting creates a breakdown in the state
political process. The state democratic process cannot be trusted in this
situation in which the burdens of the laws will be borne by those who are
not constituents.
140. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); see also Greve, supra note
13, at 116 n.143 (characterizing Justice Stevens as "the Court's most forceful advocate of
constitutional preemption" under the dormant Commerce Clause).
141. 520 U.S. 564.
142. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 571.
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As did Justice Rutledge before him, Justice Stevens has relied on this
political process justification for the dormant Commerce Clause. In
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner,144 Justice Stevens quoted the
political process concerns that Justice Rutledge had expressed forty years
previously. With regard to laws discriminating against interstate
commerce, Justice Stevens wrote, "'Provincial interests and local political
power are at their maximum weight in bringing about acceptance of this
type of legislation. With the forces behind it, this is the very kind of barrier
the commerce clause was put in the fundamental law to guard against. '"l 45
In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,146 Justice Stevens repeated this
political process justification for the dormant Commerce Clause. He
explained that the design of the tax and subsidy scheme at issue shifted the
burden of the tax onto out-of-state entities. Accordingly, the "State's
political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative
abuse."' 147 Justice Stevens relies heavily on the well-functioning political
process to protect federalism, and he sees an important role for the courts to
intervene when structural defects impair the impartial operation of
democracy.
IV. ASSESSING INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM IN ACTION
Part III argues that Justice Stevens's jurisprudence can be understood to
advance an interactive model of federalism. This part evaluates the
resulting doctrine. First, it examines the extent to which interactive
federalism, as illustrated in Justice Stevens's positions, advances the goals
often associated with federalism. Next, the part further explores the
underlying assumptions revealed in Justice Stevens's opinions. Finally, I
turn to a brief methodological assessment of Justice Stevens's federalism
jurisprudence.
A. The Values of Federalism
By harnessing the interaction of state and federal power, interactive
federalism aspires to promote the values of choice, self-governance, and
restraining tyranny, while avoiding the doctrinal and theoretical problems
associated with dualist federalism. In the three main areas canvassed-
federal regulatory jurisdiction, judicial jurisdiction, and state regulatory
jurisdiction-Justice Stevens's instantiation of interactive federalism
appears to advance these aims.
144. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
145. Id. at 281 n.12 (quoting Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 434 (1946) (Rutledge,
J.)).
146. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
147. Id. at 200.
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1. Choice
With regard to the scope of congressional power, Justice Stevens's votes
to uphold federal regulation seem at least as likely to advance the goals of
federalism as are the Court's decisions voiding the challenged enactments.
Most of the federal laws did not restrict individual choice in any meaningful
way. The case that presents the most difficult issues is Raich. Unlike
Lopez and Morrison, Raich concerns an actual, direct conflict between state
and federal law, and indeed between state and federal policy. No states
endorse guns in schools or violence against women, but California did want
to allow medical use of marijuana. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion
prohibiting this form of state experimentation.
The justification for this restriction on state policy divergence lies in the
political process. Some state choices have interstate effects. One of the
roles of the national government is to address such negative externalities.
Justice Stevens explained how Congress might reasonably have concluded
that a comprehensive national approach to marijuana was necessary and that
local deviation would undermine that larger regulatory scheme. Like the
problem of externalities that Justice Stevens explicitly noted in supporting
federal environmental regulation, 148 California's marijuana use might affect
other states. The choices of these other states deserved protection as well.
With regard to the scope of judicial jurisdiction, Justice Stevens supports
a kind of second-order choice. Litigants enjoy broad choice of forum in
pursuing their claims. Justice Stevens supports the view that plaintiffs can
bring their federal claims to state court without the strictures of federal
justiciability requirements. 149  His position in Pennhurst would allow
plaintiffs to choose a federal court as the forum for their state claims against
the state. 150 His permissive choice-of-law approach effectively allows
plaintiffs substantial ability to choose the law that will apply to the
dispute. 15'
Justice Stevens's jurisprudence regarding state regulatory jurisdiction
poses more difficulties. Justice Stevens's general presumption against the
federal preemption of state law certainly promotes state experimentation
and individual choice. His support for a relatively robust dormant
Commerce Clause, however, appears to thwart state regulatory choice.
Indeed, in some measure, his dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
represents a greater judicial intrusion on choice than his position in Raich.
In that case, the question was whether Congress rationally could have
decided that national regulation was necessary. The California law
presented a direct conflict with an enacted federal statute. In the dormant
Commerce Clause area, by contrast, the Court speaks where Congress has
148. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 195 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See supra Part ILI.B.2.a.iii.
150. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
151. See supra Part III.B.3.
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not. Congress always can overrule the Court's decision, but the Court sets a
default rule against certain kinds of state regulations. The Court, not
Congress, defines a conflict between state and federal policy.
Two factors appear to explain Justice Stevens's approach to the dormant
Commerce Clause. First, as he emphasizes in West Lynn Creamery, the
dormant Commerce Clause attempts to guard against failure of the political
process.152 He finds that the ability to retain benefits while exporting costs
distorts the normal state political process.
Second, the dormant Commerce Clause appears to be an area in which
Justice Stevens finds that the Constitution speaks with unusual clarity.
Justice Stevens understands the vindication of a national society and the
overcoming of divisive state practices as the central purpose of the United
States Constitution. States never enjoy the license to violate national
policy. In the area of preemption, Justice Stevens resists striking down
state regulations unless Congress has clearly expressed the need for
uniformity. With regard to the dormant Commerce Clause, We the People,
speaking through the Constitution, have made uniformity an overriding
national imperative. That constitutional history provides powerful support
for the doctrine.
2. Self-Governance
Self-governance overlaps substantially with the value of choice. Both
speak to the ability of states to produce diverse policy outcomes in light of
the differing preferences of their citizens. The republican argument for self-
governance, however, emphasizes the need to respect the integrity of state
institutions and to facilitate democratic control over the states.
The Rehnquist Court generally sought to promote self-governance by
protecting state governments from federal regulation. The interactive
approach, adopted by Justice Stevens, fosters self-governance by allowing
states to work with the national government in formulating shared solutions
to shared problems and by enforcing principles of state governmental
accountability.
In New York v. United States, for example, the overall regulatory regime
struck down by the Court was the product of a direct agreement among the
states, themselves. 153 To understand the Court's holding to advance self-
government, one would have to adopt the majority's abstract notion of
defining clear lines of accountability, as opposed to the more practical
approach of Justice Stevens, who refused to understand federalism to
prohibit the states and the federal government from deciding to cooperate to
advance shared goals.
With regard to state sovereign immunity, the difference between the
dualist and the interactive approach is especially stark. The Court
152. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994).
153. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 189-94 (1992) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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understands sovereign immunity to protect state policy discretion, as well as
state "dignity,"' 154 by safeguarding the state fisc. 155 However, this kind of
immunity provides limited protection to states because they remain bound
by the underlying federal statutes. Given this context, state sovereign
immunity seems to offer little but an invitation to states to violate the law.
From the interactive approach, federal court jurisdiction promotes self-
governance by ensuring that states follow the law, both federal law and, in
the Pennhurst situation, state law. Further, as Justice Stevens has pointed
out, from the overall perspective of republican theory, providing special
immunity to the sovereign is anomalous. 156
3. Restraining Tyranny
The dualist and interactive models differ markedly in their understanding
of how federalism restrains tyranny. Dualism guards against tyranny
through judicially enforced limits on the scope of governmental authority.
Interactive federalism, by contrast, protects against governmental
overreaching by unleashing state and federal power. For interactive
federalism, it is the dynamic clash of governments that protects individuals.
The Court's dualist approach to sovereign immunity strikes a strong blow
in favor of tyranny. The Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
licenses states to act in a lawless fashion. Justice Stevens's interactive
approach allows federal courts to make sure that states do not violate
important rights. Ideally, states would obey federal law, and judicial
enforcement would not be necessary. If states do not obey the law,
however, federal courts should remain open for redress. That kind of
redundancy, a staple of interactive federalism, represents significant
protection against tyranny.
B. Background Assumptions Examined
This account of Justice Stevens's interactive approach to federalism
highlights certain key assumptions. Confidence in the political process and
a belief in a generally shared set of national values are central
characteristics of his approach.
1. Impartial Governance
A belief in a generally well-functioning political process underlies
various features of Justice Stevens's federalism jurisprudence. Congress
generally can be counted on to accommodate the interests of states.
154. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999).
155. See id. at 750-51 ("A general federal power to authorize private suits for money
damages would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with
the will of their citizens.").
156. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96-98 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 1123 (1993).
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Because Congress is better suited than the courts to assess the potentially
conflicting needs of states and of the national government, courts should
not supervise these congressional determinations. Conversely, matters in
which the political process may not work properly require judicial
intervention. Thus, the Court must aggressively enforce the dormant
Commerce Clause when states burden other states.
By the same token, potential voter confusion does not constitute a
substantial concern. Even without strict lines of demarcation, voters will be
able to determine whether to hold state or federal officials accountable. For
this reason, the federal government can regulate local activity and can
commandeer state administrative processes without interfering with
electoral accountability. Similarly, accountability does not suffer when
state courts enforce federal law and federal courts enforce state law.
Citizens can determine what law applies, and if dissatisfied, they can seek
to change the law.
This generally optimistic understanding of the political process does raise
questions about Justice Stevens's approach to federalism. From a public
choice perspective, this view of politics is naive and misleading. 157 Public
choice theory analyzes politicians as rational maximizers of their particular
interests, such as campaign contributions and electoral support. "Impartial
governance" has little traction in this worldview. Justice Stevens certainly
understands issues of political economy. With a strong interest in antitrust
law, he is well aware of the temptations of monopolization in a variety of
areas. His experience has led him to resist the equation of politics and
markets. In this, as in other domains, Justice Stevens's generally optimistic
disposition influences his jurisprudence.
2. Shared National Values
The interactive vision that Justice Stevens advances generally focuses on
how states and the national government can cooperate and compete so as to
advance a largely shared set of goals. States may be laboratories, but they
are laboratories devoted to generally accepted ideas of scientific progress.
They are experimenting with different policies, but they generally agree
about the results they are seeking. States always must closely conform to
national policies, whether embodied in federal statutes (as in the sovereign
immunity cases and in Howlett v. Rose) or directly in the Constitution (as in
the dormant Commerce Clause cases). To the extent the interactive model
views state values as not fundamentally diverging, conformity to national
policy appears less onerous.
The general agreement about national policy also helps to explain Justice
Stevens's views about states' potentially "overenforcing" federal rights, as
157. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991) (reviewing
and analyzing central public choice tenets); Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing:
Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (1997) (developing the theory that
politicians will feign interest in political actions to attract interest group support and money).
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in Michigan v. Long. "Overenforcing" would seem to imply a
corresponding "underenforcement" of something. A state court that
dismisses a criminal prosecution based on an overly broad view of what the
Constitution requires might be said to be underenforcing state criminal
law. 158 From Justice Stevens's perspective, that kind of underenforcement
does not constitute a problem of federal concern. Why?
One possible reason for lack of concern might be complete lack of
federal interest in the proper functioning of the state legal system. That
view really would equate the state of Michigan with Finland. In this
conception, safeguarding the federal rights of individuals constitutes the
sole concern of the national government. The states' abilities to achieve
their own goals deserve no respect. An alternative position, however,
would be that states and the national government are engaged in the
common project of ensuring human dignity in the criminal process. States
share the federal interest in protecting criminal defendants. From this
perspective, "overenforcing" the rights of criminal suspects impairs neither
a federal interest nor a state interest. As long as state courts engage in good
faith 59 in this joint national project, federal courts should leave them alone.
The vision of states and the national government pursuing a largely
shared set of values in turn lends support for Justice Stevens's embrace of
the political safeguards of federalism. To the extent that state and federal
interests conflict, one might have less confidence in the national political
process properly resolving the disputes. However, if states and the national
government agree on fundamental goals, Congress might function well as a
place to coordinate the actions of the states and the national government.
C. A Federalism of Structure
Interactive federalism rests on structural, rather than on textual or
originalist premises. The model seeks to provide a normatively satisfying
account of how federalism can function in the United States today. The
model may correspond to arguments based on original meaning or on the
constitutional text, but those are not the sources on which it rests.
Justice Stevens generally develops his federalism jurisprudence without
being tethered to arguments based on history or text. Justice Stevens shows
more concern with the needs of the United States today than with the vision
of the framers in the late eighteenth century.' 60 Yet, through Justice
Rutledge, Justice Stevens does give originalist support to his theory of
federalism. Relying on Justice Rutledge's argument about the Commerce
158. See Baker, supra note 100, at 856-59.
159. With regard to the presumption of good faith, Justice Stevens has made clear his
"confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The market for the possession of handguns by school-age children is, distressingly,
substantial. Whether or not the national interest in eliminating that market would have
justified federal legislation in 1789, it surely does today." (footnote omitted)).
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Clause as an instrument of national union, Justice Stevens argues that the
original meaning of the Constitution justifies a jurisprudence of national
empowerment. Justice Stevens's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
appears closely connected to this originalist argument.
As suggested above, it is Justice Stevens's dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine that fits least well with the overall interactive approach. Much
state law benefits residents of the state. Many state programs draw funds
from taxing sources located both in and out of the state, and state
regulations may burden those involved in interstate commerce. Targeting
all such laws may disable a significant amount of worthwhile state
regulatory policy. 161 In other words, the normatively most problematic
aspect of Justice Stevens's federalism jurisprudence appears to depend
heavily on originalist arguments. In this way, Justice Stevens's
jurisprudence suggests that the interactive model would do well to stick
with structural arguments and to be wary of originalist supplementation.
CONCLUSION
"The creative thing in this country, the miracle of America, is that out of
diversity and out of differences we have created unity."' 162 So wrote Justice
Rutledge. Justice Stevens also remains firmly committed to the idea of
national unity. For him, federalism is not incompatible with the ideal of a
strong union. After all, for all its commitment to federalism, the
Constitution of the United States was designed primarily to promote
national unity.
Justice Stevens's jurisprudence of federalism reflects that understanding
of the centrality of the union. Justice Stevens takes seriously the notion that
states may devise alternative regulatory solutions. His approach to
preemption would grant substantially more leeway to state regulation than
did the decisions of the Rehnquist Court. Uniformity, for its own sake,
should not squelch diversity.
At the same time, he remains vigilant for state laws that threaten to foster
economic disunity. Certain values inhere in the constitutional structure, and
courts must protect them. In general, though, it is up to the political process
to reconcile the conflicting values implicated by federalism. Unlike in the
case of individual rights, the political process is the proper venue for
disputes about federalism. Placing federalism in the national political
process is not subjecting states to a hostile adversary, but ensuring that the
shared goals of the union can be enjoyed by all people in the United States.
161. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 460-61 (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine of the Rehnquist Court); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal
Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance,
81 Tex. L. Rev. 1551, 1591 (2003) ("Dormant Commerce Clause review has the effect of
foreclosing or undermining a wide range of important state policies, such as responsible
attempts at waste disposal, state safety regulation, and efforts to encourage important state
industries." (footnotes omitted)).
162. Wiley B. Rutledge, Unity Out ofDifference, 20 Dicta 275, 275 (1943).
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What remains to be determined is how the political process should go
about advancing the goals of federalism, how Congress should make
appropriate choices about regulatory design. What is the proper level of
concurrent authority? When do the interests in uniformity and
accountability outweigh concerns for plurality and redundancy? Justice
Stevens's approach confers much responsibility on Congress for realizing
the promise of federalism. His jurisprudence of federalism requires a
robust legisprudence of federalism. Justice Stevens does not prescribe that
legislative theory. Of course, that is not Justice Stevens's obligation. Ever
mindful of the judicial role, Justice Stevens would not presume to tell
Congress how to fulfill its duties. He does his job with full confidence that
others will do theirs.
Notes & Observations
